The Philanthropy As One Big Impact Investment: A Framework For Evaluating A Foundation’s Blended Performance by Aggarwala, Rohit T. & Frasch, Claudine A.
The Foundation Review 
Volume 9 Issue 2 
6-30-2017 
The Philanthropy As One Big Impact Investment: A Framework For 
Evaluating A Foundation’s Blended Performance 
Rohit T. Aggarwala 
Columbia University 
Claudine A. Frasch 
Gensler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr 
 Part of the Nonprofit Administration and Management Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy 
and Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aggarwala, R. T., & Frasch, C. A. (2017). The Philanthropy As One Big Impact Investment: A Framework 
For Evaluating A Foundation’s Blended Performance. The Foundation Review, 9(2). https://doi.org/
10.9707/1944-5660.1370 
Copyright © 2017 Dorothy A. Johnson Center for Philanthropy at Grand Valley State University. The Foundation 
Review is reproduced electronically by ScholarWorks@GVSU. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/tfr 
The Foundation Review  //  2017  Vol 9:2    119
Evaluating a Foundation’s Blended Performance
Sector
The Philanthropy As One Big Impact 
Investment: A Framework For Evaluating A 
Foundation’s Blended Performance
Rohit T. Aggarwala, Ph.D., Columbia University, and Claudine A. Frasch, M.B.A., Gensler
Keywords: Impact investment, philanthropy, foundations, performance evaluation, benchmarking, 
venture philanthropy, endowment management
Introduction
There are few hotter topics in the philanthropic 
world these days than impact investing. From 
the White House to the World Economic Forum 
to the Giving Pledge, the idea of making invest-
ments that also yield social good has received 
significant attention (Rodin & Brandenburg, 
2014; Brest & Born, 2013). And yet, it remains a 
troubled field for most foundations and philan-
thropists (Daniels, 2016; Foley, 2015). While 
some foundations — notably, the F.B. Heron 
Foundation — have put their entire focus on 
impact investing, philanthropy still lacks the 
tools that enable such investments to be made 
with the same rigor as the best financial invest-
ments and philanthropic grants (Miller & 
Johnson, 2015; Miller & Rogers, 2014). As Antony 
Bugg-Levine and Jed Emerson (2011) have 
pointed out, the key challenge is to find a rigor-
ous approach to evaluate the “blended value” of 
impact investments. 
In this article, we propose a framework for eval-
uating the blended performance of an entire 
foundation’s outlays — both grants and finan-
cial investments — by quantifying both impact 
and financial returns separately, and using 
them as two axes on a graph. Inspired by Harry 
Markowitz’s work, which underpins modern 
financial portfolio theory, this approach uses a 
foundation’s existing outlays to chart its overall 
blended performance by creating an “endow-
ment-grant allocation line” (Markowitz, 1952). 
This, in turn, makes it possible to evaluate 
whether the blended value of impact invest-
ments could improve the foundation’s overall 
performance, even if those investments generate 
Key Points
 • While some foundations have put their 
entire focus on impact investing, philan-
thropy still lacks the tools that enable such 
investments to be made with the same 
rigor as the best financial investments and 
philanthropic grants. This reveals a more 
fundamental problem: We do not currently 
manage foundations as the integrated 
portfolios that they are.
 • This article proposes a framework for 
evaluating a foundation’s blended perfor-
mance that enables both grantmaking and 
endowment investing to be evaluated jointly, 
and thus also allows a complete evaluation 
of how impact investments could improve — 
or fail to improve — overall performance. 
 • The article demonstrates the framework’s 
utility by using it to evaluate a set of 
actual impact investments in the field of 
the environment. Using this framework to 
assess foundations’ performance would not 
only improve fundamental performance, but 
also potentially unlock vast new areas of 
social entrepreneurship.
below-market financial returns and smaller 
impacts than traditional grants. Fundamentally, 
the framework presented here evaluates the 
entire foundation as one big impact investment, 
even if the foundation currently uses only the 
most traditional tools of grantmaking and an 
endowment focused solely on financial returns. 
We have used this approach to evaluate a set 
of actual impact-investment opportunities that 
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1370
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were seeking funding in 2012. First, using the 
long-term average returns of a high-performing 
nonprofit endowment and a high-performance 
environmental grant that we had analyzed, 
we created a theoretical philanthropy and 
graphed its endowment-grant allocation line. 
We then analyzed the promised impact and 
financial returns of a set of 22 potential impact 
investments related to climate change in a stan-
dardized way that also took into account the 
duration of investment; with this, we were able 
to rigorously evaluate each in a way that could 
fairly compare dramatically different types of 
investment opportunities. Significantly, when 
compared to the theoretical philanthropy’s 
endowment-grant allocation line, several of these 
impact investments that seemed attractive indi-
vidually actually would have reduced the overall 
performance of the philanthropy, while others 
that seemed less attractive on their own actually 
would have improved the portfolio’s perfor-
mance. In this way, the framework eliminates 
the uncertainty of blended-value analysis and 
allows the investor’s judgment to focus instead 
on the most important question about any 
investment, which is execution risk.
The Trouble With Impact Investing
For all the discussion about impact invest-
ing, it is a term and a field that seems to raise 
more questions than answers. Foundations and 
philanthropists struggle to figure out whether 
impact-focused investments make sense and 
what to expect from them. Should these invest-
ments avoid financial risk, or seek outsized 
returns? Should they take first-loss positions in 
order to catalyze the participation of traditional 
investors, or would that simply be subsidizing 
someone else’s return? How much of a foun-
dation’s assets should go into “impact invest-
ments”? And there is also the issue of how to 
calculate the impact of an investment — espe-
cially before you make it, which is when that 
information is really useful (Brest & Born, 2013; 
Bugg-Levine & Emerson 2011).
Adding to the confusion, advocates of impact 
investing take widely differing positions on what 
level of financial returns should be expected. 
Some argue that there is an unlimited set of 
opportunities that have lots of impact while 
receiving market-rate returns or better — which 
has the unsettling implication that we ought just 
to cancel grantmaking altogether. Others use 
the term “patient capital” — nicely compliment-
ing those willing to wait a long time to get their 
money back, but often ignoring how much value 
even low inflation rates eat up over a decade or 
two. And there is always the disturbing possibil-
ity that the social entrepreneurs pitching to you 
might really be planning to sell their “social busi-
ness” for millions, and see you more as a source 
of low-cost capital than anything else (Rose-
Smith, 2016; Milligan & Schöning, 2011).
Finally, there is the very real issue of how to 
make, and manage, impact investments. Most 
program officers have an advocacy or pub-
lic-sector background; they aren’t accustomed 
to evaluating for-profit business plans. The 
money managers could do so, but they won’t be 
as focused on impact, and their incentives aren’t 
well aligned since they usually get compensated 
on the financial performance of the endowment. 
For the occasional impact investment where 
the impacts are huge and simply couldn’t be 
achieved through a grant, the grantmakers will 
likely get excited and be willing to fund it out of 
their budget; in the same way, impact opportu-
nities that really are financial home runs — beat-
ing the risk and return standards of the overall 
endowment — will get done through the nor-
mal investing process. The ones in between will 
either fall into a no-man’s-land or require direct 
intervention from the CEO to get done (Godeke 
& Burckart, 2015).
Unfortunately, this no-man’s-land is where most 
impact-investment opportunities lie; even when 
they have the potential for high returns, they 
come with greater uncertainty. Navigating the 
no-man’s-land requires a level of integration 
across functions that few foundations achieve. 
A potential impact investment must be evalu-
ated on both its impact and its financial return, 
funded either from the grantmaking budget or 
the endowment, and managed for both aspects of 
its performance. 
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And this is a problem, because it is easy to con-
clude that such opportunities fail both the 
impact test and the market test. For philanthropy 
to embrace impact investing fully, it must find a 
way to understand these opportunities in terms 
of their blended value of both impact and finan-
cial return. Several efforts are underway to stan-
dardize and make transparent the impacts of 
for-profit entities, which will help evaluate indi-
vidual impact investments in a systematic way 
(Godeke & Burckart, 2015; Miller & Johnson, 
2015; Miller & Rogers, 2014; Bugg-Levine & 
Emerson, 2011).
Even with rigorous analysis, however, any 
investment is good only if it improves the over-
all performance of the fund or firm making 
the investment. Thus, for any given impact-in-
vestment opportunity, the rigorously evalu-
ated blended value must be compared to the 
rigorously evaluated blended performance of 
the foundation considering it. And that is the 
bigger problem — because, while foundations 
generally evaluate both their endowment per-
formances and their grants, they rarely con-
sider the two in conjunction with one another 
(Coffman & Beer, 2016).
Visualizing the Foundation’s Blended 
Performance to Evaluate Investments
The irony here is that the foundation itself is, 
essentially, one big impact investment. A donor 
puts an endowment into a foundation; in return, 
he or she expects to receive both impact on the 
world and the preservation of financial value to 
enable future impact. Each year, the investment 
team works to make financial returns, and the 
grantmaking team is given a portion of those 
returns to create impact. At the end of the year, 
the foundation has two metrics by which it can 
understand its performance: the net change 
in the endowment and the impact generated. 
Taken together, in terms of Bugg-Levine and 
Emerson’s concept of blended value, this is its 
blended return. 
The fact that every foundation has a blended 
return is clear every time a board decides to 
spend more than its required distribution to 
realize some time-sensitive impact opportu-
nity, or to cut grantmaking to preserve capital 
in times when the endowment shrinks due to 
poor financial performance. Thus, a good board 
instinctively manages for both financial and 
impact performance, even if it sticks with the 
traditional tools of pure grantmaking on the pro-
gram side and financial-return-only objectives 
on the endowment side. In other words, it seeks 
to optimize blended value — which is to say, it 
manages itself like an impact investment.
If the foundation is an impact investment, why 
doesn’t the end-of-year board meeting struggle 
with the same challenges as impact investments 
do individually? The truth, of course, is that 
foundations rarely attempt to measure them-
selves on a blended, quantitative basis. While 
most grantmakers today present detailed metrics 
for each grant, only a few foundations really eval-
uate their overall impact in hard numbers. Those 
that do struggle to boil impact performance 
down to even a few metrics (Colby, Fishman, & 
Pickell, 2011). Even more, the resource-intensity 
of the impact generated is almost never consid-
ered; the endowment managers have usually 
left the boardroom before the discussion of the 
grantmaking program has begun. 
And this leaves unanswered perhaps the most 
important question the board should consider 
— the foundation’s blended performance. In the 
corporate world, a key metric of performance 
[T]he foundation has two 
metrics by which it can 
understand its performance: 
the net change in the 
endowment and the impact 
generated. Taken together, 
in terms of Bugg-Levine and 
Emerson’s concept of blended 
value, this is its blended return. 
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is return on invested capital (ROIC), which is 
to say, “How much money did we make taking 
into account how much money we are tying up 
in order to make money?” A foundation’s equiv-
alent to ROIC would be its combined impact and 
financial return, divided by the total assets in its 
endowment at the beginning of the year. This 
would be its blended performance.
One reason foundations don’t attempt to mea-
sure blended performance is that there would 
be very little utility to the number. In theory, 
if a bunch of foundations adopted the same 
approach, it could serve as a comparative metric. 
And while this would be useful, it wouldn’t nec-
essarily improve performance; just as different 
industries have different average ROICs, foun-
dations in different fields or focused on different 
priorities would have structurally different levels 
of blended performance. 
The better use of blended performance would be 
to evaluate what specific investments, grants, or 
impact investments would actually improve the 
overall performance of the whole foundation. 
Most companies convert their ROIC into a “hur-
dle rate” for such decisions — the rate of return 
specific to that company below which an invest-
ment destroys value by reducing its ROIC below 
an acceptable level. 
Doing this for a foundation relies on return-
ing to the source of modern financial-portfolio 
theory. In 1952, in an article that ultimately 
won him a Nobel Prize, Markowitz argued 
that portfolio managers were evaluating their 
investments in an entirely misguided way by 
focusing only on the return of an individual 
asset. Instead, he argued, they should look at 
the contribution that each investment made to 
their overall portfolio’s performance, which had 
not one metric, but two: financial return and 
risk. By plotting the return and risk of each risky 
asset (stocks, bonds, real estate, etc.), he argued, 
an investor could find the “efficient frontier” 
where any desired increase in return required 
the acceptance of more risk. Further, he pointed 
out that by blending this efficient portfolio of 
risky assets with “risk free” treasury bonds that 
returned less but had zero functional risk, an 
FIGURE 1  Visualizing Financial and Impact Returns Together
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investor could create a portfolio with any desired 
level of risk along a “capital allocation line” that 
connected the efficient frontier with the return 
associated with the risk-free asset (Markowitz, 
1952; Rubenstein, 2002).
Markowitz’s overall approach allows us to create 
the same kind of benchmark for a foundation. 
We start by imagining the entire foundation as 
a single portfolio that makes capital outlays in 
pursuit of both financial return and impact. (See 
Figure 1.) The vertical (y) axis indicates the annu-
alized financial return, and the horizontal (x) axis 
indicates the impact achieved. Financial returns, 
as usual, are represented as an annual percentage 
or, in other words, on a per-dollar basis, because 
a 10 percent return means 10 cents returned for 
each dollar in the endowment each year. To be 
consistent, we would show impact in standard-
ized units of annualized impact per dollar in the 
grant budget. (See Appendix A.)
In general, the endowment taken alone would 
be in the top left of the graph, with (one hopes) a 
10 percent to 15 percent financial return, but no 
impact yielded. The grant program, considered 
alone, would be at the lower right corner, yielding 
impact but losing all of its investment — in other 
words, a negative 100 percent financial return. 
If we assume that both the investment man-
agers and the program officers are doing their 
jobs well, then each should be at the outer edge 
of what is possible for their tools: the endow-
ment team simply can’t get a sustained higher 
annual return, and the grantmaking team can’t 
improve its overall impact per dollar in their 
current programs. 
Therefore, a line between these two points on 
the graph defines the combined financial and 
impact performance of the foundation’s total 
portfolio in any giving scenario. Using only these 
two instruments, a foundation cannot achieve 
results beyond this line. For example, if a foun-
dation’s grants in a single year equaled 50 per-
cent of its total assets, its financial return would 
be just above negative 50 percent, but with a 
much greater impact. (See Figure 2.) If it gave 
away its endowment’s total earnings, its overall 
FIGURE 2  The Endowment-Grant Line
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performance would be where the diagonal line 
crosses the x-axis. The average foundation — 
earning perhaps 11 percent on its endowment 
and allocating 5 percent of its start-of-year assets 
to grantmaking — would see an overall financial 
return of approximately 6 percent and a rela-
tively small impact return. 
Thus, for a foundation using only market-rate 
investments and best-in-class grants, the amount 
of money allocated to grantmaking is the key 
determinant of impact achieved. This “endow-
ment-grant allocation line” is the equivalent of 
Markowitz’s capital allocation line — the inves-
tor can achieve any point on the line simply by 
reallocating assets, but it cannot move above or 
below the line unless new asset classes emerge.
With our “endowment-grant allocation line” 
defining the foundation’s overall potential per-
formance, every other investment can be eval-
uated comparatively: The endowment includes 
many investments, which range from financial 
loss to occasional outsized returns, and the 
grants include some home runs and a few that 
didn’t succeed. Impact investments, generating 
both kinds of return, will appear in the much 
larger space between the axes. (See Figure 3.) 
And this, quite clearly, demonstrates how value- 
creating impact investments can be identified. 
Any investment that is above and to the right of 
the line generates a blend of financial and impact 
returns that the current endowment-grant 
structure could not achieve; it will improve the 
overall performance of the foundation. Any 
investment that falls below the line destroys 
value; the money is better kept in the endow-
ment’s financial portfolio and the proceeds used 
to fund grants. (See Figure 4.) 
Can We Really Quantify Impact?
Of course, the real challenge is how to turn this 
theory into an actual, usable set of numbers that 
informs an investor prior to an investment deci-
sion. The field of impact investing has expended 
significant effort in ways to quantify and report 
the impact associated with an investment, 
such as the Impact Reporting and Investment 
Standards (IRIS) tool, but these generally are not 
FIGURE 3  Plotting Impact Investments
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designed from the outset to help select the next 
one (Bhouri, 2011).
On the financial side, quantifying value is 
easy because it is precisely what the concept of 
“money” exists to do. In the 19th century, econ-
omist William Stanley Jevons defined money as 
offering four functions: a medium of exchange, 
a common measure of value, a standard of 
deferred payment, and a store of value. If philan-
thropy had a unit of impact that could accom-
plish these four things, our analytical challenge 
would evaporate. But a metric that could cut 
across multiple fields of philanthropy eludes us 
(Jevons, 1875).
However, some program areas do lend them-
selves to quantitative impact analysis. The Robin 
Hood Foundation works hard to quantify the 
impact on poverty alleviation expected from 
its portfolio of grants. The foundation assigns a 
monetary value to the expected benefits of the 
intervention’s outcomes (e.g., one additional 
person graduating from high school increases 
his lifetime earnings by X dollars), and then it 
calculates a cost/benefit ratio for each potential 
grant (Weinstein, 2009).
Another area that lends itself to rigorous impact 
quantification is environmental philanthropy, 
which today is highly focused on mitigating 
climate change. Directly or indirectly, cli-
mate-change philanthropy is about spending 
money to keep greenhouse gases (GHGs) out 
of the atmosphere. Because GHGs are fungible 
across the planet, are quantifiable in a single unit 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), and have 
predictable utility across time, climate-change 
philanthropy has a metric that is just as analyti-
cally powerful as money.
The key, then, is to analyze impacts with the 
same rigor as one analyzes promised financial 
results. And here, too, we run into a gap: we 
lack the conventions that financial analysts take 
for granted. In climate change, the rules devel-
oped for carbon-trading systems focus on precise 
determination of “additionality,” to ensure that 
the public is actually getting the GHG reduc-
tions it paid for. These are useful rules for their 
FIGURE 4  The Endowment-Grant Line as the Foundation’s Hurdle Rate
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purpose, but they don’t help the ex-ante evalu-
ation of climate-change-focused investments. 
They are, in fact, more like the accounting stan-
dards used in a financial audit. Any honest invest-
ment manager will tell you that the numbers 
you crunch before making an investment would 
never pass an audit; they are full of uncertainties 
and estimates because they are trying to predict 
the future without allowing uncertainty to pre-
vent action. They are kept within reason by a 
set of conventions about how financial returns 
should be estimated. Similarly, much of our legal 
structure exists to ensure that financial flows do 
not get double-counted: when two people claim 
the same money, a lawsuit ensues. But every 
grantmaker knows that many parties often claim 
the same impact. So, we need not only usable 
ex-ante estimates of impact, but also an approach 
to determining how much of the overall impact 
can be claimed by any one investor. 
So, could a climate-change-focused foundation, 
using avoided GHGs as its currency of impact, 
evaluate an impact investment? Easily. It should 
be no more difficult to model the GHG reduc-
tions expected from an investment than it is to 
estimate its future revenues and costs. It should 
be feasible to adopt a notional discount rate for 
GHGs, on the basis that a ton of GHG reductions 
today is worth more than a ton of GHG reduc-
tions 10 years from now. Just as every investment 
plan has to discount expected returns based on 
uncertainty in the broader market and the risk of 
poor execution, it should be feasible to discount 
our impact estimates to account for the risk 
that circumstances might change and the risk 
that our managers might fail to deliver on their 
plans. Because even a huge foundation doesn’t 
have unlimited resources, we will also need to 
consider how much capital must be invested, 
and how long it is tied up, in order to achieve the 
expected amount of impact — much as an inves-
tor already considers these investment character-
istics in a financial internal rate of return. And, 
if a key purpose of the investment is to prove 
that a new business model works so that others 
adopt it (the “demonstration effect”), a real-op-
tions approach can incorporate the value of those 
future impacts. Perhaps the most difficult aspect 
of this would be to determine how much of the 
overall GHG reductions are attributable to any 
particular investment, taking into account other 
players working on the same goals, other inves-
tors in the same project, and external factors that 
might influence the outcome. 
This sounds like a long list, but each analysis 
requires only a set of reasonable rules and some 
analytical legwork to get done. And we are not 
aiming for auditable figures: just as the law uses 
the “reasonable man” standard, we can use the 
“reasonable board member” as the person we 
must convince, rather than an auditor. And our 
reasonable board member should be impressed; 
chances are, these are far more rigorous a set of 
rules than boards are accustomed to seeing used 
to assess philanthropic initiatives. (See Table 1.)
So, Does It Work in Practice?
To test this approach, we modeled a set of 22 
potential impact investments and three poten-
tial grants whose nonfinancial purpose was to 
reduce GHG emissions, using the conventions 
described above. Most of the impact investments 
were active opportunities undertaking fund-
raising in 2012, when this research started; five 
were theoretical opportunities for which no 
business plan had yet emerged. The set was cho-
sen to span a broad range of investment types, 
including debt and equity, early-stage venture 
capital to project finance, initiatives with easily 
quantified impact and those with indirect and/
or shared impact, and with terms that range 
from two to 20 years. As the end points of our 
“endowment-grant benchmark line,” we used 
the average 10-year financial returns of the 
best-performing large university endowment 
and one large GHG-related grant in which we 
had been involved and for which we had detailed 
cost, impact, and allocation data. 
The results indicated that there is much insight 
to be gained from a rigorous approach to ana-
lyzing blended value. (See Figure 5.) Each of the 
potential investments identified had smart, expe-
rienced proponents whose intuition led them to 
think the investments would have great impact. 
But, even accounting for the fact that they were 
expected to return money to the foundation, 
most had such small impacts per dollar invested 
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Issue Approach Method
Establish 
pro-forma 
value flows.
• How much impact 
do we expect over 
the duration of the 
investment term?
• Just as a financial 
analyst models expected 
periodic cash flows, 
model the expected 
impact quantities 
associated with the 
same time periods.
• Create a pro-forma model of 
expected impact flows, by 
time period.
• Often, but not always, impact 
flows will follow the same 
expected growth trajectory as 
the business itself.
Determine 
ownership of 
value flows.
• How much of the 
impact generated by 
this investment can we 
legitimately claim?
• Consider other investors 
(including owners) and 
capital providers: Do 
they also have claim to a 
portion of the impact?
• Are other impact-
motivated players 
involved elsewhere in the 
delivery channel, or is 
the investment building 
on other impact-
driven work, such as 
regulation?
• Similar to allocating 
enterprise ownership based 
on an investor’s capital 
contribution, but expanded 
to consider external 
influences contributing to 
the accumulation of impact, 
in order to avoid double-
counting of impact claims
Discount for 
the time value 
of impact.
• Some impacts, such 
as carbon reductions, 
are less important if 
made tomorrow than 
the same amount of 
reductions made today.
• “Time value of impact” • Apply an appropriate discount 
rate to determine the present 
value of expected impact.
Adjust for the 
uncertainty of 
getting your 
return.
• Will the business plan 
be executed?
• Will the product be 
used as intended?
• Will the widgets work, 
and how long will they 
last?
• Estimate execution risk, 
permanence risk, and 
other types of uncertain-
ties for each investment.
• Apply cumulative “haircuts” 
to quantities of estimated 
impact.
Include the 
value of potential 
follow-on impact.
• How do we value the 
fact that our purpose 
is to demonstrate that 
this business model is 
feasible?
• Perform a real-options 
analysis using likelihood 
and scale of follow-on 
impact.
• Consider how much of 
the follow-on impact we 
can attribute to our initial 
investment.
• Develop informed scenarios 
of the potential timing and 
quantities of impact beyond 
the investment term; assign 
probabilities.
Determine the 
“impact IRR.”
• Is this investment 
better than a grant, or 
than an investment that 
yields greater returns 
but takes longer?
• Consider how much 
capital must be invested 
and for how long in 
order to achieve the total 
estimated impact we 
can claim.
• Calculate the quantity of 
impact per dollar invested, per 
year of the investment term.
TABLE 1  Impact Quantification Guidelines
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that they were really best considered only on 
their financial merits. Looking more closely, 
some specific opportunities surprised us. One 
investment sounded great but proved to destroy 
value; in retrospect, it was so capital-intensive per 
unit of impact that it could not compete with the 
baseline endowment-grant combination. Another 
was unimpressive at first glance, but it achieved 
so much financial leverage by bringing in nonim-
pact investors that the large quantity of impact 
easily justified reduced financial returns to the 
impact investor. Another took so long to realize 
impact that the discount rate ate up its value. 
Above all, though, our results also demonstrated 
this heartening fact: a number of the opportuni-
ties we saw do have the potential to improve the 
overall performance of the foundation. And some 
clearly did trade off financial returns for impact, 
giving the philanthropic impact investor a key 
role to play. (See Appendix B.)
These results, therefore, demonstrate also the 
limitations of the after-the-fact reporting formats 
many impact investors use to monitor the level 
of impact their investments have had. Tools such 
as IRIS are useful for the auditing function, to 
ensure over the long term that the field is not 
selling snake oil. But they are not always use-
ful to predict the impact of potential individual 
investments. If impact investing is to compete 
for capital with the traditional philanthropic 
approach of earning money and then making 
donations, it must adopt far more precise ways of 
selecting those investments that will create value 
for the foundation as a whole. Making impact 
investments imprecisely and then evaluating 
them rigorously will — inevitably — lead to 
lackluster performance. Only when quantitative 
analysis drives investments will the field’s actual 
performance realize its potential.
Our results also demonstrated one additional 
benefit to this kind of rigorous analysis: that 
there is a huge, unexplored white space that 
philanthropy can and should consider. Most of 
the impact-investment opportunities we ana-
lyzed fell into two clusters: some were truly val-
ue-creating, while most clustered closely around 
the profitable end of the endowment-grant 
benchmark line, indicating, essentially, “busi-
ness plans with some positive social benefit.” 
(See Figure 6). This makes sense; while lots of 
FIGURE 5  Results of Analysis, With Characteristics of Selected Opportunities
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people seek proposals for grants and profitable 
business plans, there is not the comparable 
demand for business plans that lose some, but 
not all, of their money while creating social 
good. Of course, there are lots of organizations 
that do good work while generating revenues 
insufficient to cover their costs; think of most 
arts and educational institutions that augment 
revenues from tuition and ticket fees with grants 
from donors. The field of social entrepreneur-
ship would clearly benefit if philanthropist-in-
vestors were to find a way to value equity stakes 
in ventures that might never make a profit but 
aren’t truly charities.
Putting This Into Practice
The approach here represents a first-cut attempt 
at developing a methodology that would con-
sider an impact investment in its true context. 
We are encouraged by the initial results and 
what we have learned through building this 
analytic model and data set. It will be necessary 
to refine the methodology through the analysis 
of additional climate-focused investments — to 
more specifically address the riskiness of finan-
cial returns (through standardized assumptions 
by asset class and business stage), as well as 
more consistently consider and account for the 
impact upside of the demonstration affect, a 
key rationale behind many impact investments 
(which can be done through a real-options-style 
analysis). Further, just as every investment firm 
develops its own models to reflect its beliefs, 
preferences, and risk tolerance, any impact 
investor will need to tailor an approach such 
as this to its own situation and purpose in the 
selection of opportunities.
Even when the framework is refined, acting on 
the opportunities it identifies will still require 
management finesse, because the traditional 
separation of a foundation’s investment and 
program teams provides no obvious place from 
which to analyze or manage investments seek-
ing both financial and impact returns. Asking 
these two groups to work together under 
existing structures seems destined for failure 
— especially if the investment managers are 
compensated on financial performance alone 
and the program officers lack financial experi-
ence. Alternatively, a separate impact-investing 
team would need not only to attract the best 
FIGURE 6  Expected Financial and Impact Returns for a Set of Impact Investments,Plotted Against 
the Endowment-Grant Line
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from both the program and financial sides of 
the house, but also ensure that they are fully 
working together and can compete fairly for 
investment dollars with both the grantmaking 
program and the endowment. For example, the 
Heron Foundation has merged its investment 
and program teams into one “capital deploy-
ment” team as it shifts its strategy to one fully 
focused on impact investing (Wallace, 2013).
Our framework provides a basis on which to 
solve these management challenges. A quanti-
tative, dual return metric offers program and 
financial staff a neutral, common ground that 
requires each to think deeply in the terms of the 
other side of the house. It provides a way for a 
board of directors to determine smart alloca-
tions of money away from grants or endowment 
funds and into impact investments at a scale that 
matters. And it offers a basis for results-based 
compensation structures that can attract money 
managers into the impact-investing space, with 
the right incentives. 
There will be challenges inherent in a transition 
from traditional foundation operations to this 
unified analytic and investment approach. But 
this framework and our results are evidence that 
it can and should be done, and with worthwhile 
result. The difficulty, and messiness, involved 
in identifying and quantifying a foundation’s 
impact is the necessary price of determining its 
effectiveness.
This framework also provides a way to contin-
uously evaluate and improve the performance 
of the entire foundation. One could imagine 
compensating all staff based on the foundation’s 
combined performance, for example, helping to 
break down the silos between the financial and 
program staff. Recognizing the fact that each 
program area will probably always have a differ-
ent unit of impact, one could break the founda-
tion’s endowment up into a separate account for 
each program, and evaluate each program using 
this framework — just as many corporations 
evaluate performance at the business-unit level. 
In such a case, fields in which impact investing 
proves more effective would do more of it; fields 
in which traditional grants prove more effective 
would stay where they are. But in both cases, 
ongoing evaluation would ensure that a founda-
tion did not miss a change in circumstance or a 
good opportunity.
Either way, the real challenge of impact investing 
is a challenge to the foundation itself: Can we 
think about our overall performance in a rigor-
ous, quantitative way that incorporates both our 
impact and our financial objectives? And can we 
do so in a way that informs and improves our 
decision-making process? If we can — and if we 
are willing to act on it — getting impact invest-
ing right offers a way not only to use new tools, 
but to improve the effectiveness of the founda-
tion as a whole. 
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APPENDIX A  Calculating an Annual Impact Return
Financial investment decisions are usually made based on two types of return calculations: net 
present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR). The NPV factors out the cost of the capital 
deployed, so has the simplicity of yielding a single number that incorporates the duration of the 
investment; with NPV, an investment that takes 10 years to yield a return can be compared to an 
investment that returns cash to the investor in one year.
The NPV, however, is appropriate only in instances where the investor has unlimited access to 
capital. By incorporating into its analysis the cost of that capital, it focuses only on the returns to the 
investor deploying the funds, not the fundamental owner of the funds. Thus, its use is most often 
appropriate in a corporate or project-type setting.
It is tempting to use a similar approach to evaluating impact, by assigning a dollar value to impact 
a priori (e.g., $1 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent) and calculating the value of the total impact 
achieved in dollar terms. However, this fails to be useful unless the philanthropist is really willing 
to buy an unlimited amount of impact at that price, which is rarely the case, especially if market 
mechanisms (such as carbon-trading markets) offer lower prices. In this way, it is similar to the NPV, 
which implicitly assumes that access to capital is unlimited.
Investors use the IRR because it does not incorporate the cost of capital; rather, the return measured 
is the total return to the holder of capital, including the rent of the capital deployed. This is appro-
priate both for the owner of the capital and in instances where the pool of capital is constrained, as 
in an endowment or investment fund. Thus, the IRR is a more appropriate metric for foundations 
because their pool of capital is limited by their endowments. 
Similarly, because philanthropists are not usually open to buying unlimited amounts of impact at 
a given price, we believe the IRR is a better inspiration for the quantification of impact than the 
NPV. This raises a problem, however: the simplicity of the IRR as a metric is due to the fact that the 
numerator (cash earned) is the same as the denominator (cash invested). When considering impact 
generated per dollar invested, the numerator and denominator are, of course, different. Thus, we 
reinterpret the IRR to be “annual return on cash invested,” which can come in the form either of cash 
or of GHGs, measured in carbon dioxide equivalents. (See Figure 7.)
FIGURE 7  Explanation of the approach used to develop a metric for impact return comparable to 
the IRR for financial return.
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APPENDIX B  Results of Analysis
*EE = energy efficiency.
Project Name: Type Actual or Hypothetical
Investment 
Term 
(years)
Impact 
Duration
Investment 
Size
Expected 
Annual 
Financial 
Return 
(IRR)
Expected 
Annual 
Impact 
Return 
(CO2e, kg)
Solar Product 
Company A  WC Loan  Actual 10 13  5,000,000 -1.9%  20.91 
Preinvestment Facility 
(infrastructure)  Loan  Actual 6 16  5,000,000 1.0%  22.81 
Modular Green Homes  Loan Guarantee  Actual 2 15  1,500,000 1.61%  0.80 
Clean Cookstoves 
(with credit revenue)  WC Loan  Actual 5 6  1,000,000 1.88%  -   
Solar Product 
Company B  WC Loan  Actual 2 5  2,000,000 2.45%  22.53 
EE Finance Fund*  Loan Fund  Actual 5 15  2,500,000 4.10%  26.62 
Truck Retrofit Fund  WC Loan  Actual 7 25  3,000,000 4.34%  7.57 
Ranchland Restoration 
Fund A  Fund  Actual 11 11  2,000,000 8.14%  0.38 
REDD Fund B (with 
partial credit revenue)  Fund  Hypothetical 20 20  75,000,000 8.63%  26.41 
Tax Equity Wind  Tax Equity  Actual 15 20  50,000,000 8.68%  1.46 
Diesel Replacement  Project Equity  Actual 10 15  1,000,000 9.36%  0.22 
EE Project Equity*  Project Equity  Hypothetical 10 15  345,000 10.22%  2.01 
Tax Equity Distributed 
Solar  Tax Equity  Actual 6 20  50,000,000 12.06%  2.23 
REDD Fund A 
(with credit revenue)  Fund  Actual 10 10  10,000,000 12.80%  -   
Biomass Power Plant  Equity  Actual 16 16  950,000 13.14%  5.03 
EE Project Company*  Equity  Hypothetical 7 14  750,000 13.94%  0.73 
Ranchland Restoration 
Fund B
 Project 
Equity  Actual 6 6  7,745,472 15.27%  0.01 
Solar Product 
Company B
 Mezzanine 
Loan  Actual 2 5  2,000,000 15.40%  22.71 
Shipping Technology 
Series B  Equity  Actual 8 18  5,000,000 17.24%  18.07 
NYC Taxi Conversion  Loan Fund  Hypothetical 12 12  26,785,200 18.92%  1.96 
LA Taxi Conversion  Loan Fund  Hypothetical 14 14  12,183,730 21.83%  2.58 
Enery Emissions 
Reduction Company  Equity  Actual 10 10  1,500,000 28.08%  18.71 
Conservation 
TIllage Project  Grant  Actual 5 10  400,000 -100.0%  19.98 
REDD Fund A (with 
no credit revenue)  Grant  Hypothetical 5 28  10,000,000 -100.0%  2.23 
Climate Advocacy 
Grant  Grant  Actual 4 20  50,000,000 -100.0%  38.56 
